Never Again: Lessons from Louisiana's Gustav Evacuation by J. J. Rosenbaum et al.
COMPILED BY 
STAND
A Grassroots Project of the New Orleans  
Workers’ Center for Racial Justice
Never Again
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AS HURRICANE GUSTAV APPROACHED AND MANDATORY EVACUATIONS 
were beginning, members of STAND, a grassroots project of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, and 
Workers’ Center staff began outreach to New Orleans’ residents waiting to board buses at the New Orleans Greyhound 
terminals. Committed to documenting the reality of the evacuation, STAND/Workers’ Center members and staff 
themselves evacuated to cities with large numbers of evacuated residents to support the residents in their struggle for a 
just and humane evacuation and return. STAND/ Workers’ Center members and staff conducted onsite assessments of 
twelve shelters in three states including three of the four Louisiana state-run warehouse shelters.  
This report summarizes information gathered from hundreds of interviews with evacuated  
residents through that work. This report was compiled and written by Tamar McFarlane, Saket Soni,  
and JJ Rosenbaum of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice. 
 
For the courageous residents who were forced into Louisiana’s state-run warehouse shelters  
and who even as they experience great indignity, had the courage to take a stand.
“We’re not asking for silver and gold, just to  
be treated like human beings.”
Young woman from New Orleans leading a prayer outside the Sam’s Club  
shelter in Shreveport, Louisiana after residents exposed horrific conditions to the media
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Never Again Lessons from Louisiana’s Gustav Evacuation
Preface
By William P. Quigley, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law,  
Professor and Director of the Gillis Long Poverty Law Center
Unless serious substantive changes are immediately made in the evacuation process we saw in Gustav, our community 
absolutely risks repeating the disasters of Katrina.
         
Katrina showed the world the consequences of not providing for the elderly, the disabled and the working poor of New 
Orleans facing possible disaster in a humane safe manner consistent with human dignity. The result was widespread death 
and continued displacement of tens of thousands of people even today.
In the response to Gustav, all levels of government showed that they are starting to learn some of the lessons of Katrina. 
Certainly, if the Gustav evacuation had happened during Katrina, many lives would have been saved.
However the very serious defects in the Gustav evacuation process have clearly damaged the potential for all future 
evacuations. The result is that a large percentage of people who evacuated for Gustav have made it clear that they will not 
cooperate with a government called evacuation in the future.  It is time for government to clearly and honestly identify 
the serious defects in the Gustav evacuation, take public responsibility for those defects, and make vastly improved public 
plans for future evacuations. 
This report details many of the problems that undercut the Gustav evacuation. Some will ask, by what standard does 
any group challenge a government effort at evacuation and shelter under extreme circumstances. The only legitimate 
response is the golden rule, which is one of the fundamental principles of justice and human rights. Were the elderly, 
the disabled and working families evacuated and sheltered in ways that other members of the community would accept 
and appreciate for our sisters and brothers, and children and mothers? The examples below testify that this threshold of 
treating our fellow humans with respect and dignity was not met.
This report by the Stand, a grassroots project of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, makes a big 
contribution towards an honest review of the many problems occurring in the Gustav evacuation.  
Now it is up to our community, particularly our local, state and federal officials to respond and to do so before another 
hurricane approaches.
Some have already said that the elderly and disabled and working families do not deserve anything more than they 
received. Such an attitude displays either a lack of knowledge of what people went through, or a cavalier disregard for the 
human rights and human dignity of our sisters and brothers. Failure to learn from the mistakes of Gustav will force our 
community to pay too high a price when the next serious disaster comes.
Our community must join together, take an honest look at what occurred and immediately institute serious changes. This 
report provides the factual basis for immediate change and the response must come immediately. 
* * *
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Executive Summary
Never Again Failures of the Gustav Evacuation
This report exposes Louisiana’s differential treatment sheltering policy which directs that in disasters, the state shall 
segregate evacuees relying on city/ state transportation in state-run warehouse shelters separate from evacuees using 
their own cars. Pursuant to this policy, the state advisory system directs self-transporting evacuees to separate parish, 
Red Cross, and church shelters with better conditions. Those who evacuate by bus are primarily the residents who do not 
have the economic means (or the cars) to self-evacuate, including homeless residents, public housing residents, low-wage 
workers, low-income renters, and their families — almost all African American.
This report’s findings are based on assessments of the state-run warehouse shelters and extensive interviews of hundreds 
of affected residents. The findings expose startling inequity.  In the Gustav evacuation, the state’s differential treatment 
policy subjected the most vulnerable state residents to extremely inhumane shelter conditions. In each of the four 
state-run warehouse shelters, over a thousand evacuees were housed in a single large one-room space. Women, infants, 
children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled were all using the same space, without privacy, and sharing the same 
bathrooms — outdoor portable toilets. They had no access to running water inside the facilities. The only showers — until 
close to the end of the evacuations — were the portable toilets outside, in which mothers were washing themselves and 
their babies with bottled water. Residents had limited access to medical care, and no access to counselors or to news from 
the state about the hurricane and its aftermath.   
KEY FINDINGS 
As Gustav approached, the poorest communities had no choice but to place themselves in the hands of the state at their 
most vulnerable moment. They trusted that Louisiana’s plan for evacuation, sheltering, and return was designed for their 
safety. Communities counted on the state for access to humanitarian relief in a time of disaster. 
The state’s plan achieved the very opposite result. The Department of Social Services sheltering policy had profoundly 
inequitable impacts on the poorest evacuees — blocking them from humanitarian relief. The policy forced those who 
were worst off into the worst shelter conditions. 
The inequitable impacts persisted well beyond the disaster. The state policy drove residents into cumulative disadvantage: 
over the course of seven days, residents became poorer and sicker as a direct result of shelter treatment and conditions. As a 
result, residents returned home to New Orleans in greater economic disadvantage and more vulnerable that when they left.
In large part these were residents who were already disadvantaged as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Three years after 
the breach of the levees, these residents were still profoundly experiencing displacement and poverty as the result of the 
failed governmental response to Katrina and its aftermath.
These residents are now deeply unwilling to trust the state or to participate in future evacuations. Almost without 
exception, residents expressed their preference to risk staying even as a hurricane approaches rather than to evacuate into 
the deplorable and humiliating conditions they had to face during Gustav.
CONCLUSIONS
Louisiana Governor Jindal and DSS Sec. Williamson should revoke the differential treatment sheltering policy, apologize 
for the suffering it caused vulnerable residents, and direct DSS to work with directly affected communities and their 
representatives to develop a new sheltering policy. 
The state’s new shelter plan must be based on principles of inclusion, access, and equity for poor and working class 
African Americans and for all communities in Louisiana. 
The state must include the directly affected communities — those who have the hardest time evacuating — in creating 
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the plan for shelters during disaster. 
A state shelter plan must give the hardest-hit communities equal access to humanitarian relief during every phase of 
disaster — because they need it the most. 
The state must ensure that the policy is equitable. The present differential treatment shelter policy plays out to 
proactively disadvantage poor and working class African Americans — whether by intention, or by impact. The state 
must instead adopt an equitable disaster policy that proactively advantages the poor by prioritizing them at the 
precise time that they are most vulnerable. 
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Introduction
“I blame the State. And I blame Governor Jindal for putting me  
in this place unfit for human beings — unfit even for a dog . . .  
Three years after Katrina, this is Katrina all over again.”
Dimetra Boykins, New Orleans’ resident evacuated to Shreveport
On August 29, 2008, three years to the day that Katrina made landfall, the state of Louisiana promulgated a differential 
treatment sheltering policy that directed the poorest evacuees to the worst shelter conditions. As a result, thousands of 
poor and working-class African American residents of New Orleans were evacuated into a public health disaster. The 
policy prescribed that residents evacuating by car — “self-transporting evacuees” — would be directed to “general 
population” shelters run by the parishes, the Red Cross, or churches. But residents evacuating by bus would bypass these 
shelters and be taken to “large capacity” state-run warehouse shelters. Those evacuating by bus were primarily those 
residents who did not have the economic means (or the cars) to self-evacuate. They included homeless residents, public 
housing residents, low-wage workers, low-income renters, and their families.  
The Louisiana Department of Social Services (“DSS”) policy, quietly issued on August 29, 2008, was lost amidst the 
din of news reports projecting a category 5 hurricane and Mayor Nagin’s statements calling Gustav “the mother of all 
storms” and warnings that there were still cracks in the levees. Residents listened and scrambled to evacuate. Without the 
means to evacuate themselves, and faced with curfews, arrests, and a hurricane if they stayed, residents from the poorest 
communities had no choice but to put their faith and their bodies in the hands of those charged with guaranteeing their 
safety — Mayor Nagin, Governor Jindal and Secretary Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security.    
By Saturday evening the first buses rolled up to the state-run warehouse shelters in Louisiana and horrified the evacuating 
residents. Over the next seven days, they were treated to deplorable shelter conditions, degrading treatment, and 
unbearable risks to their health and sanity. In each of the state-run warehouse shelters, over a thousand evacuees were 
housed in a single large one-room space. Women, infants, children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled were all using 
the same space, without privacy and sharing the same bathrooms — outdoor portable toilets. Evacuated residents had 
no access to running water inside the facilities. The only showers — until close to the end of the evacuation — were the 
portable toilets outside, in which mothers were washing themselves and their babies with bottled water. Residents had 
limited access to medical care and no access to counselors or to news from the state about the hurricane’s effects on their 
homes. And in at least one shelter, in Bastrop, Louisiana, local police and national guardsman subjected residents to such 
inhumane treatment that mothers fear their children are permanently scarred from the experience.
Evacuees responded by pleading with shelter staff for help, and when it did not come, by fighting for their own health and 
dignity. They protected their children, demanded more infrastructure, called the media, held press conferences, collected 
almost two thousand petition signatures, and contacted local mayors and state government officials.  Across the shelters 
their message was the same: Would you stay here? Would you evacuate into these conditions? Could you sleep here?  
As the state continued to remain unresponsive to vulnerable people in nightmarish conditions, the evacuated residents 
spoke out to ensure that the impact of the state’s failed policy was made public.   
The impact of the state’s policy did not stop at seven days of indignity and humiliation. The real impact was the 
cumulative disadvantage that evacuated residents faced by the end of their stay in the shelter. This cumulative impact 
was profound.  Residents in the shelters were already economically disadvantaged when they evacuated.  Most were 
still reeling from the governmental failure to restore New Orleaneans to their homes and livelihoods in the aftermath of 
Katrina. The residents getting on the buses Saturday morning had already spent the three years since Katrina grappling 
with displacement, homelessness, and poverty. By the end of their evacuation, on Sunday night, the experience in the 
shelters had driven them into a far greater level of economic and physical disadvantage than when they had left their 
homes. The state’s lack of preparation and infrastructure in the shelters forced them dig into their own limited resources 
and spend their money on basic necessities they would otherwise have spent on rent upon their return. The cumulative 
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economic disadvantage was compounded by the fact they left the shelters stripped of physical and emotional health. 
Sick residents left the warehouse shelters even sicker, healthy adults left the warehouse shelters sick, and parents left the 
warehouse shelters with children who had picked up serious illnesses.    
This report bears witness to the horrific conditions faced by residents evacuated by the state of Louisiana during 
Hurricane Gustav, the policy directing the most vulnerable residents to these inhumane shelters, and the courageous 
actions of evacuees to fight for dignity. Residents now demand that Governor Jindal revoke the State’s differential 
treatment policy, apologize to the affected residents, and direct the DSS to work with affected residents and their 
advocates to create a new sheltering policy that prioritizes access, inclusion, and equity for all state residents. Such a 
policy should proactively advantage the poorest evacuees. Never again should the state adopt policies that specifically 
disadvantage its most vulnerable residents — poor and working class African Americans. Never again should state 
humanitarian policy leave residents struggling for the most basic necessities of their families — housing, food, medical 
care — because they used their last dollars to purchase basic supplies to survive the evacuation. Never again.   
11
Never Again Lessons from Louisiana’s Gustav Evacuation
What was Louisiana’s Differential Treatment  
Sheltering Policy During the Gustav Evacuation?
“We got on the buses even though we didn’t have any idea where we were going.  No one 
would tell us- but somebody must have known. Even the bus drivers acted like they were 
sworn to secrecy even though they knew where to drive to.” 
Charleston Preston, West Bank resident evacuated to Bastrop 
From the moment they arrived at the Greyhound station, evacuating residents wanted to know where they were going. 
Understandably, as they fled their homes and their city with limited personal effects, these were critical assurances in a time 
of crisis and vulnerability. But none of the volunteers, staff, bus drivers, or even the media would tell the tens of thousands of 
residents where the departing buses were going. Even as they rode on buses for as long as a day, residents couldn’t convince 
even the bus drivers to divulge their intended destinations. Surely someone knew where the buses were going. 
Louisiana’s DSS knew very well the destinations of the buses. As the state agency with the responsibility for emergency 
sheltering including “location readiness, facility management and staffing, distribution of comfort and relief supplies, 
feeding, and first aid …” DSS had been refining a specific plan for evacuating and sheltering state residents since 2006.1 The 
Gustav evacuation revealed that the state’s plan not only involved differential treatment of the most vulnerable residents but 
inequitably directed them into the most inhumane shelter conditions.
In 2006, the state first announced intentions to segregate those evacuees requiring transportation assistance in separate 
state-run warehouse shelters, publishing on the DSS website that, “for the first time, the state will have its own state-
run shelters to accommodate evacuees who need state transportation assistance.” 2 Those residents who did not have 
cars that were reliable enough for an evacuation— mostly working poor, African American communities — were 
distinguished from “self-transporting evacuees” who would evacuate in their own vehicles and be treated differently.3 
The state evacuation advisory system would direct evacuees using state transportation to state-run warehouse shelters, 
while self-transporting evacuees (those with their own cars) would be directed to separate shelters run by the Red Cross, 
churches, and parishes. At that time, DSS noted that it was identifying spaces for the state-run warehouse shelters. 
DSS’s announcement notes that, “a vacant building doesn’t automatically translate into a potential shelter site. Certain 
requirements beyond mere space are examined such as the structural soundness and safety of the building (wind load and 
elevation, for example, are assessed.) The physical resources of the building also are assessed, such as bathrooms, as well 
as its location.” 4 No information was published about why the state sought out “warehouse” facilities. By 2008, however, 
the state had identified four warehouse sites that could house up to 9,600 people total.5
On August 29, 2008, on the third anniversary of Katrina, the state announced its policies for the Gustav evacuation, 
based on the 2006 plan. “The state will operate large-capacity sheltering facilities to house citizens who are evacuated 
out of harm’s way via city/state assisted transportation,” stated the DSS press release.6 Thus the buses were directed to 
the four state-run warehouse shelters in Louisiana as well as shelters in other states specifically designated as “critical 
transportation needs shelters.”7 Self-transporting evacuees were separately directed to the nearest “general capacity 
shelters.” These general capacity shelters included parish-run shelters and those run by parish partners included the 
1	 Louisiana	Department	of	Social	Services’	Press	Release,	“State	Gears	Up	Shelter	Plans	for	Upcoming	Storm	Season,	Urges	Residents	to	Plan	
Ahead,”	May	18,	2006,	http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/archive/shelplans.htm,	(last	visited	Sept.	14,	2008).
2	 Ibid.	
3	 Ibid.	
4	 Ibid.
5	 September	11,	2008	Public	Records	Act	Response	from	DSS.	On	file	with	the	Workers’	Center.
6	 Louisiana	Department	of	Social	Services’	Press	Release,	“DSS	Provides	Primer	on	Emergency	Support	Function	6:	Mass	Care,	Emergency	As-
sistance,	Housing	and	Human	Services,”	August	29,	2006,	http://www.dss.state.la.us/Documents/DSS/Hurricane_Documents/Gustav_fs_shelter-
ing.pdf	(last	visited	Sept.	24,	2008).
7	 Ibid.
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Red Cross and churches.8 The state’s shelter-information points directed all evacuees to these shelters segregated by the 
evacuees’ type of transportation.9 What residents on buses would soon learn was that this differential treatment policy 
based on transportation, in effect, ensured that the poorest residents were segregated and alone bore the burden of the 
ill-equipped warehouse shelters.  
As the Gustav evacuation of residents relying on city/state transportation began on Saturday, state officials should have 
known that the state-run warehouse shelters were desperately unprepared for human habitation. National guardsmen 
arrived on Thursday August 28, and DSS employees arrived on Friday, August 29 to prepare the state-run shelters. It 
must have been apparent to them, as it would soon be to the over one thousand evacuated residents directed to each 
shelter, that the warehouses were simply not ready as shelters for human beings. At that time, the state-run warehouse 
shelters lacked even the most basic provisions — showers, toilets, basic medical provisions for the arriving babies, elderly, 
and diabetic residents, and basic privacy for changing clothes, nursing, and medical procedures. While the state’s 2006 
communication suggested that “the resources of the building also are assessed, such as bathrooms” would be a factor in 
site selection, on-site shelter assessments show that at least three of the four warehouse shelters lacked even the basic 
provisions of indoor toilet facilities as late as a week into the Gustav evacuation.10
 Although the inadequacies of the state-run warehouse shelters must have been in plain view to national guardsmen and 
DSS staff, the state of Louisiana did not alter its plan. For example, DSS could have directed the first departing buses to 
Red Cross or other shelters that were already prepared while taking the additional 24-48 hours to improve conditions at 
the state-run warehouse shelters. But it did not do so — perhaps with the implicit knowledge that while the warehouse 
shelters could be made more humane, they would never reach a basic adequacy standard in time.  
Although not publicized to affected residents and publicly softened by the bureaucratic label “critical needs 
transportation shelters,” the state’s choices created the obvious result: many of the state’s most vulnerable residents — 
those still fighting to recover after Katrina — were sent to the most unprepared facilities. By the end of the week, the 
residents experienced the physical, economic, and emotional scars of the state’s failed policy. 
8	 Ibid.
9		 Ibid.
10	 Louisiana	Department	of	Social	Services’	Press	Release,	“State	Gears	Up	Shelter	Plans	for	Upcoming	Storm	Season,	Urges	Residents	to	Plan	
Ahead,”	May	18,	2006;	see	e.g.	Shreveport	and	Bastrop	Shelter	Assessments	included	herein.
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Who Was Impacted by the Policy and How?
The people who lined up at the Greyhound Station to take the “city- or state- assisted transportation” had no other path 
out of harm’s way as Gustav approached. Residents who needed the buses were the ones who did not have cars and who 
were too poor to be “self-transporting evacuees.” Why did they need the buses? These were the residents who were still 
disadvantaged from governmental and public policy failure after Katrina. Three years later, the impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina— displacement and poverty— were still profoundly affecting poor peoples’ lives as they lined up to at the 
New Orleans’ Greyhound station on August 29, 2008. And they were the ones who ultimately ended up in the “critical 
transportation needs shelters” examined in this report. 
Charleston Preston stood in line with his son and partner. He describes how his life changed after Katrina: 
I was going to school when Katrina hit — I was attending school and working to take care of my family. After Katrina hit, there 
was too much going on with getting back. I dropped out of school and just continued to work to take care of my son. 
As Gustav approached, Charleston, his girlfriend and two-year old son were still saving for a security deposit on an apartment 
in New Orleans. He scrambled to evacuate, and was taken by bus to a state-run warehouse shelter in Bastrop, Louisiana. 
Christine McCann also stood in line. A mother who was evacuated on a state bus to state-run warehouse shelter in 
Shreveport, she echoed the story of many residents: 
Since Katrina I’ve been supporting my family paycheck to paycheck without any cushion. We’ve been making it month to 
month, but we didn’t have enough money for a reliable car and insurance. I didn’t have much emergency cushion. So we 
relied on state transportation when they issued evacuation warnings for Gustav. 
Dimetra Boykins of Uptown describes why she got in line: 
On August 29th, my children came home with a letter and flyer from their school about evacuation. I had no other means 
to evacuate with my family. I did not have a vehicle or a hotel reserved. If I had a car, I would not have to rely on the 
city bus.  
For Charleston, Christine, Dimetra, and thousands like them, state buses were the last and only resort in a mandatory 
evacuation. They had the most basic of expectations — to protect the lives and health of their families and to spend as 
little time as possible away from their homes. 
Unfortunately, the state’s differential treatment policy not only robbed them of their dignity and health, it left them 
significantly worse off financially after the Gustav evacuation. The impact of the state’s sheltering plan was clear: it 
cumulatively disadvantaged their families in the struggle for stability upon return. 
Because they had to spend the next month’s rent money on food and other basic supplies, evacuated residents from state-
run warehouse shelters returned home with a sense of dread about the long term impact of Gustav on their families’ 
housing, medical care, and basic needs. Christine voiced the concerns of many residents when she explained: 
Many residents, including myself, had to spend our rent money to get by [in the shelter]. I had to buy food and bathing stuff 
for over a week for my family . . . My landlord won’t look at my receipts and say, ‘I understand what happened.’ The whole 
time I was worried whether I would be put out with my husband and son when I went back because I was using money that 
was meant for rent. Now I have two weeks to find rent money, and I do not know where it will come from. This evacuation 
could leave me homeless.
Charleston explains that medical bills from sicknesses related to the inhumane conditions in the Shreveport shelter are 
putting severe pressure on his family’s finances. 
My son got sick, so sick that since we returned he has been in the hospital. . . Now I have a bill that I have to figure out how 
to pay because they evacuated my family into such a horrible facility.
The state’s differential treatment policy in effect forces the cost of the evacuation plan back onto those residents least 
able to bear it. Residents evacuating from disaster should be protected from other burdensome costs of evacuation by the 
quality of humanitarian assistance provided at the shelters where they are sent. This is real humanitarian assistance — 
14
Never Again Lessons from Louisiana’s Gustav Evacuation
evacuated residents are able to return and move forward in rebuilding their lives. Under the DSS Gustav sheltering policy, 
however, the poorest residents who have to rely on the state for transportation are sent to the shelters where the state’s 
failure forces them to finance their own emergency plan. Thus they spend money owed for next month’s bills keeping 
their families safe. 
The cost does not stop there. An additional cost — and a profound one — is the collective loss of faith in government-
assisted evacuation. Charleston and Dimetra voice a widespread consensus that residents will not evacuate again without 
assurances of humane conditions: 
If I had known, I would never have gone. The shelters were not equipped and not prepared. I do not know what I would do if 
I had to evacuate again, but I will not bring my children into a facility with no bathroom and no shower — where we aren’t 
treated with basic respect. — Dimetra 
In case the Mayor and Governor don’t know, people are not going to line up again and evacuate. The shelter was not fit for 
human being much less animals. [The shelter was] so degrading; I will never evacuate to a shelter like this again. I’d rather 
stay home. — Charleston
The cumulative disadvantage faced by the most vulnerable residents further prejudices the reconstruction and general 
stability of the city. Government policies should support residents living on the border of economic stability — not push 
them further over. But as Dimetra Boykins recognizes, that would involve decisionmakers like the Governor putting 
themselves in her shoes:  
I want the people in leadership to consider: would they want their children to be treated like animals? Our ‘leaders’ need 
to start treating people the same way they would want to be treated. Would they live in those shelters? Then why should we 
have to live in those shelters?   
As we examine the disastrous state-run warehouse shelters, we invite decisionmakers to step into the experience of the 
evacuees who lined, got into buses, reached an undisclosed destination, and were shocked to learn how wrong they were 
to trust the state at their time of greatest vulnerability. 
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Overview of the State-Run Sam’s Club  
Warehouse Shelter, Shreveport, Louisiana11
The first buses full of evacuees from New Orleans pulled up to Jewella Street in Shreveport, Louisiana on the evening of 
Saturday, August 30, 2008.  This warehouse shelter was shocking even at first glance. When they first saw the shelter— 
an abandoned Sam’s Club warehouse — the evacuees were surprised; some said they initially thought there had been 
a mistake. “I asked the bus driver if we were lost,” said Alan, a New Orleanean evacuated by bus to Shreveport. “But he 
didn’t answer. That’s when I realized it’s not a mistake; this is where they’re putting us.” Over 1000 people, predominantly 
working class African American residents of New Orleans — infants, children, seniors, individuals with disabilities, men 
and women, and individuals with illnesses, including diabetes — were all evacuated into this enormous warehouse.  There 
were no divisions of the space, and they slept in cots that were laid shoulder to shoulder on the floor.        
The shelter lacked the most basic infrastructure. Over 1000 residents shared one microwave and one refrigerator for 
general use. As a result, mothers could not heat or refrigerate food for infants, and residents initially had no access to 
running water within the facility. In the beginning, national guardsmen blocked even disabled residents and seniors from 
using the two functioning toilets within the facility. After a certain time, DSS responded to the lack of showers by opening 
the utility closet to seniors, and then to the general population, for two minute baths using the same utility bucket.  
Because there were no other showering facilities, many of the over 1000 residents shared the one bucket — granted 2 to 
5 minutes to wash themselves. Other residents reported “bathing” in dirty portable toilets using bottled water. Mothers 
reported fighting physical disgust as they bathed their children out of bottles. “I had to wash my baby in a port-o-potty.
After I finished I told her, I’m sorry. I told her she doesn’t deserve to be treated like that. But I had to wash her in there,” 
said Dimetra Boykins. Initially residents counted approximately 20 portable toilets; close to 48 were in place by the time 
Workers’ Center organizers arrived to assess shelter conditions.
DSS staff distributed meals through one food line, which meant that over a thousand people lined up each mealtime. This 
resulted in hours-long waits for food and many people went hungry.  DSS provided no special food for individuals with 
medical dietary restrictions. Diabetics reported not eating because they did not want to risk eating the food provided for 
general consumption. A number of diabetics noticed drastic changes in their blood sugar that caused them insecurity and 
panic. 
Evacuees received no news from DSS — no briefings or updates — about the impact of Hurricane Gustav on their home 
and communities, or about DSS’s plans for their return to New Orleans. There wasn’t even a television or radio in the 
facility until some residents set up one television set which the over 1000 residents then shared. “They won’t even tell 
us how our homes are or what is going on in New Orleans,” said Derek William. Stranded far from home, residents 
understandably had questions: Where did the hurricane hit?  Was my neighborhood affected?  What plans are being 
made to take us home?  Will we get financial assistance when we get back?   Residents reported asking DSS staff, national 
guardsmen, and local police, but no one would respond. Being cut off from news compounded residents’ sense of panic, 
and led to mounting tensions among residents and between residents, law enforcement, and DSS staff.  Other than the 
print material and verbal updates supplied by STAND/ Workers’ Center organizers, no written material was distributed 
to the evacuees and no news was given regarding the state of their home city and what New Orleans leadership was 
saying about the prospect of return.
Evacuees also faced tension from individuals in the Shreveport community. African American youth in the shelter 
reported that across the street local white residents asked them to stand in line at a gas station; when they did not, a local 
resident pulled a gun on them. None of the law enforcement at the shelter investigated the matter.
And even at night, the overhead lights were never shut off. At the Old Sam’s shelter, the harsh steel-white fluorescent 
lights stayed on 24 hours a day, creating for the residents a bleary illusion of time at a standstill.       
11	 For	more	detail,	see	the	Old	Sam’s	Club	Shelter	Assessment,	included	herein.
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Overview of the State-Run Wal-Mart  
Warehouse Shelter, Bastrop, Louisiana12
When Tina Nuccio’s bus pulled up to Bastrop, Louisiana late Saturday night, it was raining. She got off the bus with other 
residents— the first evacuees from New Orleans to arrive in Bastrop. They were rushed into an old Wal-Mart building 
utterly unfit for them. There were no cots, no bathrooms, and no showers—evacuated residents reported that DSS said it 
did not have any beds and bathroom facilities because they were not expecting evacuated residents yet. Tina recounted 
that amidst the rain, the darkness, and the unprepared staff, she slipped and hit her head on the tile floor. She waited over 
two hours before receiving assistance to go to the emergency room. When Charleston Preston, Sr. arrived a little later, he 
noticed a bad odor immediately upon entering the building and immediately worried for the health of his family.  
Tina and Charleston were two of over a thousand residents taken to a state-run shelter in an abandoned Wal-Mart 
warehouse in Bastrop, Louisiana. Much like the Sam’s Club shelter in Shreveport, the building was “unfit for human 
beings.” The only bathrooms were portable toilets outside, installed soon after the first evacuees arrived. The National 
Guard blocked residents’ use of the handful of functioning toilets in the facility.  Brooke, the mother of a handicapped 
child, reported being allowed by a national guardsman to use those facilities for her child in an emergency, but she was 
told, “If you’re not out in two minutes, I’ll break the door down.” There were no shower facilities for five days. Residents 
were given bottles of water and told to shower in the portable toilets.  “For us to have to leave our house to go into port-o-
pottie to shower with shit, tissue, and crap all over — I will never evacuate like this again,” said Charleston, expressing the 
sentiment of many residents.
Residents reported mildew on the walls and in the vents, and even possibly asbestos in the floor. The facilities and these 
conditions made the residents sick and overwhelmed the limited clinic capacity. “My husband and son threw up every 
day,” reported resident Tina Nuncio. “The nurse they had wasn’t enough to ensure everyone who was in need was seen.”  
The increasing sickness of residents was also a public health disaster given that the facility was not cleaned on a daily 
basis. Charleston Preston’s son was so sick by the end of the evacuation that he had to have his tonsils removed.  
Despite their level of humiliation and physical sickness, residents evacuated to Bastrop did not list the facilities and 
physical condition of the shelter as their most serious concern. Instead, the evacuees housed in Bastrop objected most to 
the actions and attitudes of the local police officers and national guardsmen present on shelter detail. 
Indeed, the number of police officers and national guards gathered outside the building resembled a law enforcement 
training facility more than a shelter for hurricane evacuees. And without exception, residents experienced these armed 
men as risks to their safety, rather than as a source of security. Parents in particular were terrified for the safety of their 
children and the trauma of this exposure. Dionne Morgan, a mother, reported that an officer dropped his gun near where 
children were playing.  Another mother, Kiesha Shelby, reported lying awake at night listening to the officers lock and 
load their weapons— “I heard it all night long, every night,” she said. “I would cover my baby’s ears while she was asleep…” 
For all the local police and national guardsmen deputized to the old Wal-Mart, the battery of law enforcement officials 
did not make anyone feel safer. When local residents drove by shouting racial epithets at the shelter or cruising the 
highway with signs that read, “Nigger go home,” law enforcement did not attempt to protect or ensure the residents’ 
safety. Law enforcement did not even set a crossing guard for children and elderly evacuees trying to step out of the 
building and cross the 4-lane highway just outside the shelter.  
Instead of ensuring shelter residents felt protected and secure, law enforcement officials operated a prison-like operation 
at the old warehouse. Residents were only allowed to use one door to enter and another— on the other side of the 
facility— to exit. Everyone— from two year-old children to the elderly— was subjected to searches with wands and metal 
detectors every time they entered or exited the facility, even when they went to, and returned from, the bathrooms. One 
youth was reluctant to take his belt off while he passed through the metal detector, because he was afraid his pants would 
12	 For	more	detail,	see	the	Wal-Mart	Shelter	Assessment,	included	herein.
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fall. Law enforcement officials forced him to take the belt off. He did, and his pants fell. Officers then arrested him for 
indecent exposure and beat and detained him. Charleston said that after this incident, many residents became so afraid of 
becoming the victims of violence at the hands of law enforcement that they sat for hours on their crowded cots, limiting 
even their basic movements around the shelter facility and parking lot. 
Evacuated resident Lethia Brooks summed up the general sentiment during the assessment when she said, “We didn’t 
want to evacuate into a prison.  We wanted to evacuate into a shelter.” The feeling of being imprisoned was sharpened 
greatly by the fact that community members, friends, and visitors — any outsiders — were barred from the shelter 
property. Residents reported that Red Cross staff and members of the media corps were denied entrance to the 
warehouse facility. Staff of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice were threatened with arrest and directed 
to leave the shelter property by local law enforcement when attempting to speak with residents. When asked why they 
could not talk with eager residents in the parking lot outside the shelter, law enforcement warned, “this is state property 
and the state does not want you here.” 
Residents summed up their feelings of powerlessness through retelling the story of one woman who was so desperate to 
get out of the shelter that she started walking down the highway. Upon learning of her departure, law enforcement set off 
and found her miles down the road. After identifying her as a shelter resident, they detained her and returned her to the 
Wal-Mart shelter. 
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Recommendations: What Changes  
do the Affected Residents Want?
“It’s the state’s policy, that’s the problem. When only poor people have to stay in state-run 
shelters then the state doesn’t care about the conditions. In the next evacuation, it ought to 
be mandatory that state officials spend a couple of nights at one of these shelters with their 
families. See how they feel having to get bottled water to wash up in a portable toilet. See 
how they feel having no showers — no privacy — no real medical care.  Let them bring their 
elderly and handicapped parents — their wife and newborn children.  
Then the state would make a real plan for these emergencies.”
Harriett Humes, New Orleans Resident evacuated to Shreveport 
From the time they arrived, evacuated residents realized that they could not rely on the state for even the most basic 
necessities. Seeing that protecting their health and dignity would require a struggle, evacuated residents began to work 
collectively to both protect their families and to force the state to do its job. “We weren’t asking for silver and gold,” 
summed up one resident, “just to be treated as human beings.”  Evacuees pooled resources to get one television so that 
residents could get the most basic news about their home communities. They shared available food, soap, towels and 
pillows to keep children and elderly family members as comfortable as possible. And meanwhile they pressured shelter 
staff, state officials, and local officials to raise standards at its shelters.  
Circulating petitions and gathering hundreds of signatures, residents showed that the problems they faced were shared by 
other shelter residents and their requests to DSS were reasonable. By the end of the evacuation, the local mayors of both 
Shreveport and Bastrop had agreed. After meeting with the residents, both accepted the petitions and agreed to forward 
them to Secretary Williamson of the DSS as well as to Governor Jindal. Calling the Bastrop shelter, “inappropriate, 
inhumane, unsanitary, and everything else,” Mayor Clarence Hawkins of Bastrop admitted to residents that the state had 
been unprepared for their arrival and care.13 Agreeing to forward their petition he said, “If something’s broke, let’s fix it- 
not cover it up.”14 
The evacuated residents’ actions worked. After they exposed real shelter conditions on the evening news in Shreveport 
and Bastrop, long sought after showers finally arrived. After the first 900 signatures arrived on Secretary Williamson’s 
desk, she came to Shreveport to conduct DSS’s first in-person assessment of the Sam’s Club shelter. Within twelve hours 
of her visit, the Shreveport Sam’s Club residents were among the first on buses homeward bound for New Orleans.  
Even as they return to rebuilding their lives, these residents maintain their call of “Never Again.” Specifically they ask that 
Gov. Jindal and Secretary Williamson take concrete measures to repair, at least in part, the damage caused to thousands 
of residents as a result of Louisiana’s shelter policy. Specifically, these residents demand that:
Louisiana Governor Jindal and DSS Sec. Williamson should revoke the differential treatment sheltering policy, and 
offer a formal apology for the suffering it caused vulnerable residents. 
Jindal and Williamson should direct DSS to work with directly affected communities and their representatives to 
develop a new sheltering policy. Both decisionmakers should meet immediately with a taskforce of evacuees, residents, 
and their representatives to being the process of creating new policy. 
The state’s new shelter plan must be based on principles of inclusion, access, and equity for poor and working class 
13	 Minutes	of	September	5,	2008	meeting	with	Mayor	Clarence	Hawkins	of	Bastrop	on	file	with	the	Workers’	Center.
14	 	Ibid.
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African Americans and for all communities in Louisiana. 
The state must include the directly affected communities — those who have the hardest time evacuating — in creating 
the plan for shelters during disaster. 
A state shelter plan must give the hardest-hit communities equal access to humanitarian relief during every phase of 
disaster — because they need it the most. 
The state must ensure that the policy is equitable. The present differential treatment shelter policy plays out to 
disproportionately disadvantages poor and working class African Americans — whether by intention, or by impact. The 
state must instead adopt an equitable disaster policy that proactively advantages the poor by prioritizing them at the 
precise time that they are most vulnerable. 
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Shreveport Shelter Conditions Assessment
 Type Of Facility	 Former	Sam’s	Club	Warehouse
 Location 8810	Jewella,	Shreveport,	Louisiana	/	Caddo	Parish
 Capacity	 3,600	Residents																									
 Number Of Evacuated	 1500	–	2000	People
	Residents Housed There
 Type Of Staff Law	Enforcement	(50-100)	24-hour	presence
	 	 Medical	(1-2)	present	9am	-5pm
	 	 Crisis	Intervention	(none)
	 	 Childcare	(none)
	 	 Elder	Care	(none)
	 	 DSS	General	staff	(unknown)
Inadequate Public Health and Sanitation
kThe shelter had no regular access to running water inside the shelters. 
kResidents were directed to bathe in a utility closet with a single bucket that was not sanitized 
between uses. 
kThere were no changing tables for babies. 
kThere was no hygienic space for daily medical needs. 
kThere were no separate eating and sleeping spaces. 
kThe inside floors or the warehouse were not sanitized daily. 
kThere were inadequate portable toilets for the number of residents (initially 20) and they were not 
cleaned often enough. 
Individual Health Concerns
kMost sick residents reported leaving sicker than when they arrived. 
kMany healthy residents also reported leaving with new 
infections and sicknesses.
kThere was no food available that was appropriate for diabetics. 
kThere was no care available for expecting mothers or those 
that had recently given birth. 
kThere were no handicapped portable toilets for 4-5 days and 
when they arrived they were inadequately cleaned. 
kThere was no medical assistance on site 24 hours a day in the 
evenings and at night. 
kThe clinic staff during the day could only dispense over the 
counter drugs. 
kThe inability of most residents to sleep caused physical stress. 
kSick residents were intermingled with other residents. 
Mental Health Concerns
kThe inhumane physical conditions caused extreme stress for 
residents. 
kThe lack of information about conditions at home and return 
also caused extreme stress. 
kThe third anniversary of Katrina brought back many 
traumatic memories to many residents. 
kFinally, the extreme presence of law enforcement also caused 
many residents extreme stress. There were no therapists, no 
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Assessments are based on onsite investigation and interviews with evacuated residents by NOWCRJ staff.  Assessments are approximate pending 
production of further data by the Louisiana Department of Social Services in response to a pending public records act request.
addition counselors, no pastoral counselors, and no other type of crisis counselors available to residents.
General Shelter Conditions
kThere were no showers for 4-5 days.
kResidents had to go outside, often in stormy conditions, to use the portable toilets.
kEven the portable toilets were not separated for men, women, and children.
kThere was no privacy for changing clothes, nursing, or other personal medical needs. 
kThousands of cots were pushed so close together that they were touching. 
kThe lights were kept on 24 hours a day. 
kThere was no refrigeration or ice for cold water or any other cold drink. 
kFood and other necessities were dispensed through one line thousands of people long. 
kThere was no scheduled recreation for kids. 
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Bastrop Shelter Conditions Assessment
 Type Of Facility	 Former	Wal-Mart	Store
 Location 2030	East	Madison	Street,	Bastrop,	Louisiana	/	Morehouse	Parish
 Capacity	 2,000	Residents												
 Number Of Evacuated	 800	left	at	the	time	of	the	assessment
	Residents Housed There
 Type Of Staff Law	Enforcement	(100	plus)	24-hour	presence
	 	 Medical	(3-4)	present	11am	-5pm
	 	 Crisis	Intervention	(none)
	 	 Childcare	(none)
	 	 Elder	Care	(none)
	 	 DSS	General	staff	(unknown)
Inadequate Public Health and Sanitation
kThe shelter had no regular access to running water inside the shelters. 
kThere were no changing tables for babies. 
kThere was no hygienic space for daily medical needs. 
kThere were no separate eating and sleeping spaces. 
kThe inside floors or the warehouse were not swept or sanitized daily. 
kThere were inadequate portable toilets for the number of residents and they were not cleaned 
often enough. 
kThe building was in ill repair and there was no certification regarding protection from asbestos or 
other environmental harms. 
Individual Health Concerns
kMost sick residents reported leaving sicker than when they arrived. 
kMany healthy residents also reported leaving with new infections and sicknesses. 
kSome residents reported an unwillingness to take regular medications which caused more 
frequent urination because using the portable toilets posed a 
greater health risk.
kThere was no food available that was appropriate for diabetics. 
kThere was no care available for expecting mothers or those that 
had recently given birth. 
kThere were no handicapped portable toilets for 4-5 days and 
when they arrived they were inadequately cleaned. 
kThere was no medical assistance on site 24 hours a day in the 
evenings and at night. 
kThe clinic staff during the day could only dispense over the 
counter drugs. 
kThe inability of most residents to sleep caused physical stress. 
kSick residents were intermingled with other residents. 
Mental Health Concerns
kThe inhumane shelter conditions caused extreme stress for 
residents. 
kThe lack of information about conditions at home and return 
also caused extreme stress. 
kThe third anniversary of Katrina brought back many traumatic 
memories to many residents. kFinally, the extreme presence of law 
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enforcement also caused many residents extreme stress.
There were no therapists, no addition counselors, no pastoral counselors, and no other type of crisis 
counselors available to residents.
General Shelter Conditions
kLaw enforcement officers were hostile and abusive. 
kCommunity workers, the red cross, and the media were each prohibited from entering the shelter. 
kResidents are subjected to a metal detector search and/or a personal search every time they 
return from the portable toilet.
kThere were no showers for 4-5 days.
kResidents had to go outside, often in stormy conditions, to use the portable toilets.
kEven the portable toilets were not separated for men, women, and children.
kThere was no privacy for changing clothes, nursing, or other personal medical needs. 
kThousands of cots were pushed so close together that they were touching. 
kThere was no scheduled recreation for kids. 
kOne resident who tried to leave on foot was returned to the shelter by the National Guard after 
walking almost 10 miles. 
Assessments are based on onsite investigation and interviews with evacuated residents by NOWCRJ staff.  Assessments are approximate pending 
production of further data by the Louisiana Department of Social Services in response to a pending public records act request.
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The following STAND members played key roles in the organizing work that produced this report:
Eloise Williams
Darnell Parker
Stanley G. Smith
Talbert Haywood
STAND and the New Orleans’ Workers’ Center for Racial Justice thank the following friends for their support:
Alistair Newbern
Bill Quigley
Brent Cox
Brother Don Everard
Jay Patel
John Bethea
Judith Browne-Dianas
Sister Lillian Flavin
Marielena Hincapie
Nsombi Lambwright
Shawn Christy
Ted Quant
Valerie Downes
W.C. Johnson
STAND and the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice also thank  
Mayor Cedric Glover of Shreveport and Mayor Clarence Hawkins Bastrop for continuing  
to do their jobs amidst the Gustav evacuation crisis.
STAND is a grassroots group of elders, farmers, skilled workers, and fathers who 
have formerly experienced or are experiencing homelessness in New Orleans.
STAND arose from the tent cities and overcrowded shelters in New Orleans; when 
7 people, frustrated with broken solutions, began to meet and saw the most viable 
solution was within us. STAND seeks to create affordable housing and safe public 
spaces for our displaced families and communities. STAND believes unity and self-
determination are the most viable solution for devastated communities in New 
Orleans. STAND is a grassroots organizing project of the New Orleans Workers’ 
Center for Racial Justice. 
The New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice is a membership 
organization that was founded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in response to 
the stark exclusion of African Americans and the brutal exploitation of immigrants 
within the new Gulf Coast racial economy.  Workers’ Center members include African-
American and immigrant workers. The Center organizes workers across lines of race 
and industry to advance racial justice and build the power and participation of poor 
and working class people of color in the post-Katrina landscape.
